Abstract-We study secret-key agreement protocols over a wiretap channel controlled by a state parameter. The secretkey capacity is established when the wiretap channel is discrete and memoryless, the sender and receiver are both revealed the underlying state parameter, and no public discussion is allowed. An optimal coding scheme involves a two step approach -(i) design a wiretap codebook assuming that the state parameter is also known to the eavesdropper (ii) generate an additional secret key by exploiting the uncertainty of the state parameter at the eavesdropper. When unlimited public discussion is allowed between the legitimate terminals, we provide an upper bound on the secret-key capacity and establish its tightness when the channel outputs of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper satisfy a conditional independence property. Numerical results for an on-off fading model suggest that the proposed coding schemes significantly outperform naive schemes that either disregard the contribution of the common state sequence or the contribution of the underlying channel.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Generating a shared secret-key between two terminals by exploiting the reciprocity in the physical wireless channel has received a lot of recent attention. See e.g, [1] and the references therein. The sender and receiver exchange pilot signals to learn the channel gains in uplink and downlink respectively. When the channels are reciprocal, the uplink and downlink gains are close to one another and this correlation is exploited to generate shared secret keys.
Motivated by these works we study the information theoretic problem of secret-key agreement over a channel controlled by one state parameter. This state parameter is revealed to both the sender and the receiver and not to the eavesdropper. In the fading model discussed above, this state parameter models the fading gain between the sender and the receiver. The sender and receiver can learn this value over reciprocal wireless channels by exchanging pilot signals, whereas the eavesdropper cannot directly learn this value. A good coding scheme for this problem exploits two sources of uncertainty at the eavesdropper -one due to the lack of knowledge of state parameter at the eavesdropper, and the other due to the equivocation introduced by the channel. As our capacity expression illustrates, there is in fact a balance between the gains from the two uncertainties.
In other related works, the case when an independent message needs to be transmitted over the wiretap channel with This work was supported in part by NSF under Grant No. CCF-0515109 state parameters (and no public discussion) has been studied in [2] , [3] , [4] . Achievable rate-equivocation regions are provided for the case of either transmitter-side information or two-sided state information, but the complete characterization of this region remains open. In contrast to sending independent messages, the formulation studied in the present paper, allows the secret key to arbitrarily depend on the state sequence.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The problem setup is described in Fig. 1 . The sender and receiver communicate over a discrete-memoryless-wiretapchannel with input symbol x, the output at the legitimate receiver Yr and the output at the eavesdropper Ye. The channel transition probability is conditioned on state parameter Sr In defining a length-n encoder and decoder, we will assume that the state sequence s~is known non-causally to the sender and the receiver. However our coding theorems only require a causal knowledge of the state sequence. We first separately consider the case when no public discussion is allowed between the encoder and the decoder and when unlimited discussion is allowed.
A. No Public Discussion
A length n encoder is defined as follows. The sender samples a random variables u from the conditional distribution PUls~(·ls~). The encoding function produces a channel input sequence x" == f n ( u, s~) and transmits it over n uses of the channel. At time i the symbol Xi is transmitted and the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper observe output symbols Yri and Yei respectively, sampled from the conditional distribution PYr ,Ye[x,Sr ( . 
Sender
Public discussion channel Fig. 1 . Secret-key agreement over a wiretap channel controlled with a state parameter. The channel is a discrete-memoryless-broadcast channel. The state parameter Sr is sampled i.i.d. and revealed to the sender and receiver. We separately consider two cases (a) unlimited interactive public discussion is allowed between the sender and the receiver and (b) no such discussion is allowed. (2) which reduces to the present formulation.
B. Presence of Public Discussion
When a public discussion channel is present, the described protocol follows closely the interactive communication protocol in [5] . The sender transmits symbols Xl, ... ,X n at times More specifically the sender and receiver sample random variables u and v from conditional distributions Puis;: (·Is~) and Pvls;: (·Is~) and observe that u -----* s~-----* v.
• At times 0 < t < iI, the sender generates cPt == <Pt (u, S~, 1/Jt-l) and the receiver generates 1/Jt == Wt (v, s~, cPt-I). These messages are exchanged over the public channel.
• At times i j , 1~j~n, the sender generates Xj == X j ( u, s~, 1/Jij-1) and sends it over the channel. The receiver and eavesdropper observe Yr,j ad Ye,j respectively.
For these times we set 1/Jij == cPij == o.
• For times i j < t < i j + l , where 1~j~n, the sender and receiver compute cPt == <Pt (u, s~, 1/Jt-l) and 1/Jt == Wt (v, s~, Y/ ,cPt-I) respectively and exchange them over the public channel.
• At time k + 1, the sender and receiver compute 1'£ == 9n ( u, s~, 1/Jk) and the receiver computes 1 ==
We require that for some sequence Cn that vanishes as n -----* 00, Pr(1'£ -1-/)~Cn and~I(I'£;Y:,1/Jk,cPk)~Cn.
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

A. No Public Discussion
The following theorem characterizes the secret-key capacity when no public-discussion channel is available between the legitimate terminals.
Theorem 1: The secret-key capacity for the channel model in section 11-A is pendent message with perfect secrecy using a wiretap codebook for a modified channel where s~is revealed to the eavesdropper (in addition to legitimate terminals). The second key, which is independent of the first key and has a rate of R src == Hts; lYe) is produced by exploiting the common knowledge of s~at the legitimate terminals. This intuition is formalized in the achievability scheme in section V-A.
Next, consider the case when for each Sr E Sr, the channel of the eavesdropper is less noisy than the channel of the legitimate receiver i.e., maxp I( t; Yr ISr) -I( t; Ye ISr) == O. In this case, the secret-key capacity reduces to C == maxH(srIYe).
Pxlsr
It is achieved by generating the secret-key based on the common knowledge of s~between the legitimate terminals and choosing an input distribution that leaks minimal information about s~to the eavesdropper. More generally, there is a balance between the amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper and the ability to transmit information over the wiretap channel in the capacity achieving scheme. This balance is reflected in the maximization in (3).
B. Unlimited Public Discussion
When unlimited public discussion is allowed between the sender and the receiver, as described in section II-B, we have the following result on the secret-key capacity.
Theorem 2: The secret-key capacity in the presence of unlimited public discussion between the sender and the receiver is C == maxI(x; YrlYe, sr) + H(srIYe). ( 
4)
PX\Sr when the channel satisfies the Markov condition Yr ---* (x,sr) ---* Yeo For any discrete memoryless channel (4) provides an upper bound to the secret-key capacity.
Remark 3: The Markov condition in Theorem 2 can be interpreted as requiring that the noise on the legitimate and the eavesdroppers channel be mutually independent. Furthermore, analogous to the capacity expression in Theorem 1 the expression in (4) also involves a sum of two terms and accordingly the lower bound is constructed by generating two separate keys.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We consider the the following on-off channel for the receivers:
curves -the solid curve is the resulting secret key rate in (8), while the dashed curve is the entropy H (SrIs, == 1, Ye) and the dotted curve denotes the secret-message rate. The upper solid and dashed curves denote the case of public discussion whereas the lower curves denote the case of no public discussion. Note that in general there is a tradeoff between these two terms. To maximize the conditional entropy we set Po == PI == P/2, while to maximize the secret-message rate we set Po == 0 and PI == P. The resulting secret-key rate is maximized by selecting a power allocation that balances these two terms. The optimum fraction of power transmitted in the state s, == 0 as a function of the signal to noise ratio is shown in Fig. 3 . Note that no power is transmitted when the signal-to-noise ratio is below~-2.5dB. In this regime the channels are sufficiently noisy so that H (s, lYe, s, == 1)~1 even with Po == 0 and hence all the available power is used for transmitting the secret-message. As the signal-to-noise ratio increases more information regarding Sr gets leaked to the eavesdropper and to compensate for this effect, a non-zero fraction of power is transmitted when Sr == O.
V. PROOFS
R == I(x; Yr ISr) -I(x; Yelsr) + H(srIYe) (6) == I(x; Yr ISr) -I(x; Ye, s, ISr) + H(sr ISe, Ye) (7) Substituting (5) Clearly the multiplexed codebook has a rate of (5) (9) Yr == Sr X + Zr Ye == SeX + Ze, ( )
is the aposterior distribution Pr(s, == 0 IYe) which is used to numerically evaluate the second term in (8). Similarly by choosing Gaussian inputs in Theorem 2, the secret-key rate reduces to 1 1 1 
where (16) follows from the fact that K s re is a deterministic function of s~and the last step is obtained by substituting (13) and (15) for the two equivocation terms.
B. Converse for Theorem I
For any sequence of codes indexed by the codeword length n, we show that the secret key rate is upper bounded by the capacity expression (3) plus a term that vanishes to zero as the block length goes to zero. Apply Fano's inequality on the secret-key rate, we have that for some sequence Cn that approaches zero as n goes to infinity nR < 1(K;I) + ne., < 1(K;s~, Y;') + ne., (18) where the last step follows from the data processing inequality since 1 = h n (s~, y;') . Furthermore from the secrecy condition we have that where the second step follows from the well known chain rule applied to difference of mutual informations (see e.g., [6] ). 
